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COMMENTS
ILLINOIS FEE TAIL STATUTE AMENDED
On July 15, 1953, an amendment to the Illinois Entailment Statute be-
came effective. This amendment is of particular significance for it presents
uncertain consequences in the field of future interests. Since 1827,1 the
Illinois Entailment Statute provided in substance that where any devise or
conveyance would create a fee tail estate at common law, then the party
to whom that estate was given would take only a life estate and the
remainder would pass in fee simple to the person or persons to whom the
estate tail would first pass under the common law at the death of the first
taker. The 1953 amendment inserts qualifying language to the effect that
the Statute should only be applicable to those cases where a fee tail would
have been created at common law ". . . without applying the rule of
property known as the Rule in Shelley's Case .... -2
At common law a fee tail estate could be created in two ways: the ordi-
nary method, by the magic formula, "to A and the heirs of his body;" or
by the operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case on a conveyance "to A for
life, remainder to the heirs of his body."
The amendment therefore expressly limits the operation of the Statute
to the fee tail which was created at common law by the words of art, "to
A and the heirs of his body," the Statute giving A a life estate and a
remainder in fee to his heirs.3
The amendment excludes and expressly excepts from operation of the
Statute the fee tail resulting from the application of the Rule in Shelley's
Case on the conveyance to A for life, remainder to the heirs of his body.
Such a conveyance did not of its own language create a fee tail estate;
however, the Rule in Shelley's Case was applied by the courts to give the
' The Illinois Statute of 1827 seems to have been copied from the Missouri Act of
1825. See Kales, Illinois Estates, Future Interests, 446 (1920).
2M1. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 30, S 5. Other states having an Entailment Statute similar
to that of Illinois are: Missouri, Colorado, Arkansas, New Mexico, Vermont (until
1941), New Jersey (until 1934), Kansas (since 1939), and Florida (since 1941). 2 Powell
on Real Property, 77, 78 (1950).
a According to the language of the statute the remainder in fee, on the death of the
life tenant, passes "to the person or persons to whom the estate tail would, ... pass,
according to the course of the common law." If this provision is construed literally
according to the common law, the primogeniture doctrine of Blackstone's canons of
descent would govern. Kales, Illinois Estates, Future Interests, 452 (1920). In Illinois,
the remainder passes to the life tenant's heirs as determined by the Statute of Descent.
Moore v. Reddel, 259 Ill. 36, 102 N.E. 257 (1913); Lehndorf v. Cope, 122 Ill. 317, 13
N.E. 505 (1887); Voris v. Sloan, 68 111. 588 (1873).
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remainder to A and by merger with A's life estate A would, at once, take
a fee tail.4 Prior to the 1953 amendment, the Statute would then operate
to convert A's fee tail estate to a life estate in A with a remainder in fee
simple to A's heirs.
Since the Entailment Statute by amendment, and the Rule in Shelley's
Case by abolishment,5 no longer operate on the conveyance "to A for life,
remainder to the heirs of his body," a problem of construction remains.
The nature of the remainder is the point in question. Is the remainder "to
the heirs of A's body" vested or contingent?
The consequences arising from the distinction between a vested and a
contingent remainder are of great significance in the fields of future inter-
ests, conveyancing and in determining chains of title. If the remainder is
construed as vested, the children of the life tenant, immediately upon
their birth, take an indefeasible fee simple, immediately conveyable, sub-
ject only to open to let other children of the life tenant share in such
remainder in fee. The children need not survive the life tenant, for upon
their predeceasing him, their heirs take an interest in the fee. In such a
case the reversioner is permanently precluded from taking the fee even if
the life tenant's children predecease him." However, if the reminder is
construed to be contingent, the children of the life tenant must survive
him in order to perfect an indefeasible interest in the remainder in fee.
They have only a mere expectancy, not a real interest, conveyable in fee.
If they predecease the life tenant their heirs take nothing. In the event
that all the children predecease the life tenant, the reversioner takes the
fee.7
At early common law, a conveyance to A for life, remainder to his
4 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin, 249 1. 406, 94 N.E. 669 (1911).
5 "The rule of property know as the the Rule in Shelley's Case is abolished. 1953,
July 15, Laws 1953" Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 30, 5 186. "This Act shall apply only to
wills of decendents dying after the effective date of this Act and to deeds, agreements
and other written instruments executed and delivered after the effective date of this
Act. 1953, July 15," Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 30, S 187.
6 Boatman v. Boatman, 198 IM. 414, 65 N.E. 81 (1902); O'Melia v. Mullarky, 124 Ill.
506, 17 N.E. 36 (1888).
7 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin, 249 Ill. 406, 94 N.E. 669 (1911); Thomas v. Miller,
161 IMI. 60, 43 N.E. 848 (1896); Ducker v. Burnham, 146 Ill. 9, 34 N.E. 558 (1893);
Howard v. Peavey, 128 Ill. 430, 21 N.E. 503 (1889); Baker v. Copenbarger, 15 I1. 103
(1853). The Illinois Supreme Court said: "Such construction, we think, is plain, viz.,
that the persons who were to take the remainder on the death of either of the life
tenants were left dubious and uncertain, so that until such death, it is impossible to
ascertain the persons to whom the remainder will go... . It thus seems to be plain
that the remainder... so long as the parent (life tenant) is surviving, is contingent,
and that it could only become vested upon the death of the parent (life tenant) leaving
surviving children or descendents." McCampbell v. Mason, 151 IM1. 500, 510, 38 N.E.
672, 675 (1894).
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bodily heirs created a contingent remainder." Prior to the death of the
life tenant, the remainder could not vest for it was impossible to ascertain
the person or persons satisfying the description "heirs." Such ascertain-
ment could only take place upon the life tenant's death; because nemo
est heres viventis. For a long time, the Illinois Supreme Court held the
remainder created by operation of the Entailment Statute to be contin-
gent.9 As a result, the Court refused to apply the Rule in Shelley's Case to
the limitation "to the heirs of A's body" because they believed the En-
tailment Statute of 1827 in effect abolished it. The Rule in Shelley's Case
converted "to A for life, remainder to the heirs of his body" into "to A
and the heirs of his body;" then the Statute operated to give A a life estate
with a remainder to his heirs, which remainder the courts held contingent,
this being the same result had the Rule not been applied.10
However, in Illinois, it became settled law, in 1913,11 that the remainder
created by the Entailment Statute indefeasibly vests in each child of the
life tenant subject only to open and let in additional children. As a result
of this construction the court now had reason for applying the Rule in
Shelley's Case and, with the necessary consequential operation of the En-
tailment Statute, the effect was to convert the contingent remainder "to
the heirs of his body" into a vested remainder in fee in the heirs of A.12
By indefeasibly vesting the remainder in fee in the life tenant's children,
though they should predecease him, the court altered the Entailment
Statute to the detriment of such persons as would actually answer the
description in the limitation of the Statute. The Statute expressly limits
the remainder in fee to "the person or persons to whom the estate tail
would, on the death of the first grantee, devisee, donee in tail, first pass,
according to the course of the common law." By course of the common
law the estate tail would pass to the life tenant's heirs, unascertainable
until his death. Under the common law it is clear that the remainder can-
not vest in the apparent heir so long as his heirship remains only presump-
tive or apparent, because such person may not, in fact, ever be the true
heir at all, and therefore may never be qualified, under the terms of the
limitations in the Entailment Statue, to take the remainder. The court, by
holding the remainder of the Statute to be vested, in reality interpreted
the limitation to read "children of the life tenant." Thus, in a hypothetical
8 2 BI. Comm. 170; Hall v. Leonard, 1 Pick (Mass.) 27 (1822).
9 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin, 249 11. 406, 94 N.E. 669 (1911); Seymour v. Bowles,
172 IMI. 521 (1898); McCartney v. Osburn, 118 111. 403 (1886); Cooper v. Cooper, 76
M. 57 (1875); Butler v. Huestis, 68 111. 594 (1873).
10 Cases cited note 9 Supra.
11 Moore v. Reddel, 259 IIl. 36, 102 N.E. 257 (1913).
12 Henry v. Metz, 382 11 297, 46 N.E. 2d 945 (1942); Steams v. Curry, 306 11. 94, 137
N.E. 471 (1922); Winchell v. Winchell, 259 Ill. 471, 102 N.E. 823 (1913).
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case, under the court's interpretation, the children of the life tenant could
sell the vested fee which the court holds they have, although predeceasing
the life tenant, thereby precluding the life tenant's brother from taking as
the only heir upon the life tenant's death. If, however, the limitation in the
Statute were read literally the brother would take the remainder in
the fee.
The Illinois Supreme Court has realized that its construction of the
reminder as vested conflicts with the wording of the Entailment Statute.
Thus in Moore v. Reddel,13 the court said:
The manifest intention of the General Assembly was to get rid of estates tail
and not to revive conditional fees,... When the question came before the court
it was clear that this provision could not be construed according to the words
used, and that the General Assembly never intended that the remainder should
pass to the person or persons to whom an estate tail would have passed accord-
ing to the course of the common law. .. . In doing away with estates tail it
could not have been the intention to restore the law as it was before the...
statute .... making the estates conditional fees. If that had been so, the General
Assembly would merely have repealed the statute de donis. . . . In as much as
the language of the act could not be adopted as expressing the legislative intent,
it was not unreasonable to hold that the purpose of the act was to provide
that issue which was in existence at the time of the grant . . . should be in-
vested with the fee simple and the reversion in the grantor be destroyed. That
such conclusion was in harmony with the legislative will may fairly be in-
ferred from the fact that the General Assembly, having power to make a
change, has not done so.14
Subsequent to the present amendment the remainder "to the heirs of
A's body" remains for literal construction unaffected by the Rule in
Shelley's Case and the Entailment Statute. Currently, as in the past, the
Illinois Court has consistently construed the remainder to be contingent
when the Rule in Shelley's Case and the Entailment Statute were not
applied. 15 Only the remainder resulting from the operation of the Statute
has been construed as vested.'0 Other states having a similar Entailment
Statute hold the remainder to be contingent. 17 Since the operation of the
1 25911. 36, 102 N.E. 257 (1913). 14 Ibid., at 43, 44 and at 259.
15"Uncontrolled by any statute we can reach no other conclusion than that the
remainder to the heirs ... (of A's body) ... was contingent during her life, since
it could not be ascertained who would be the heirs of her body until her death...."
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hoppin, 249 111. 406, 415, 94 N.E. 669, 672 (1911). See also,
Sauls v. Cox, 394 1. 81,67 N.E. 2d 187 (1946).
16 Cases cited note 12 supra.
17 Arkansas: Mitchell v. Mitchell, 208 Ark. 478, 187 S.W. 2d 163 (1945); Watson v.
Wolff Goldman Co., 95 Ark. 18, 128 S.W. 581 (1910). Missouri: Davidson v. Davidson,
167 S.W. 2d 641 (Mo. App., 1943); Davis v. Austin, 156 S.W. 2d 903 (Mo. App., 1941).
Vermont: In Re Wells' Estate, 69 Vt. 388, 38 Ad. 83 (1897); In Re Kelso's Estate,
69 Vt. 272, 37 Atl. 747 (1896). 111. Ann. Rest., Property § 99 (1947): Not in accord
with Illinois construction as vested.
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Entailment Statute and the Rule in Shelley's case is precluded by the
amendment, the Court, on the basis of common law and precedent, should
in the future construe the conveyance "to A for life, remainder to the
heirs of his body" as creating a contingent remainder.
Perhaps the legislature, notwithstanding the abolishment of the Rule in
Shelley's case, inserted the amendment for the purpose of obtaining the
legal result which prevailed during the period when the Court was not
applying the Rule in Shelley's Case, since the remainder under the Entail-
ment Statute was then construed as contingent. Even after the remainder
under the Statute was held to be vested it appears that the courts seized
upon the slightest alternative to withdraw the conveyance from the appli-
cation of the Rule in Shelley's Case and the Entailment Statute, and there-
by construe it literally. Thus it is possible that the older cases which re-
jected the operation of the Rule in Shelley's Case survived as a rule of
construction.' The legislature may have felt that when one conveys "to
A for life, remainder to the heirs of A's body," that the giver did not
intend the children of A, who predeceased A, to share in the remainder,
or that his possibility of reverter be terminated by the remainderman's sale
prior to the giver's predeceasing the life tenant. This intention would be
accomplished by construing the remainder as contingent, whereas, when
one conveyed an estate to "A and the heirs of his body," the giver was
not thinking in terms of remainders, since he gave out all he had, and it
would not violate his intention to construe the Entailment Statute's re-
mainder as vested, which the Court has been doing. The recent Illinois
legislation eliminated the incongruity of result in using the Rule in Shel-
ley's Case to defeat the grantor's intention in order to apply the Entail-
ment Statute which further defeated his intention. 19
However, whether the remainder is vested or contingent subsequent to
the amendment is a question yet to be determined by the Illinois Supreme
Court.
18 Carey and Schuyler, Illinois Future Interests, 167 (1941). See also Kales, Estates,
Future Interests S 419 (1920).
19 Kales, Estates, Future Interests, 470 (1920): "Thus, where the remainder is to the
heirs of the body of the life tenant, the intent of the testator is twice defeated. The
Rule in Shelley's Case defeats it by giving A an estate tail, and then the statute on
Entailment defeats it by turning it into a life estate in A and a vested and indefeasible
remainder to his children on birth thereby destroying any remainder limited over after
A's death without heirs of his body at his death. The intent of the testator may be
shattered even more violently. Suppose for instance, that the limitations are to A for
life, remainder to the heirs of the body of A, but if A dies without heirs of his body
at his death, then to B and his heirs. Suppose that A died without issue surviving him
after having had issue. If the Rule in Shelley's Case applies A will take an estate tail
with a gift over on a definite failure of issue. By the statute A will take a life estate
with a remainder in fee in his children, vested in them indefeasibly upon birth, and the
gift over, by force of the statute, will be destroyed and the heirs or devisees of A's
chidren (their spouses incuded) will take. This is ruining the testators intention with
a vengeance."
